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Abstract 
This paper investigates the impact of corporate governance on financial 
performance by cement firms listed in Saudi stock market during the period of 2012-
2016. Many studies have examined the association between corporate governance 
mechanisms, ownership structure and firm performance, the most of them conducted in 
the developed countries, produced diverse findings, influenced by the nature of the 
dominant governance system for each country. Using the Least Ordinary Square (OLS), 
the results of the current study revealed that managerial ownership and firm size have a 
positive and significant impact on firm performance. However, board independence, 
board size, board meeting and audit type have no effect on the financial performance.  
Keywords: corporate governance, board structure, ownership structure, performance, 
Saudi Arabia. 
  ملخص
المدرجـة على األداء المالي لشـركات االسـمنت السـعودية تأثير حوكمة الشركات تبحث هذه الورقة في 
سات، معظمها من البلدان المتقدمـة، درسـت العالقـة بـين آليـات حوكمـة راعدة د. 2016-2012خالل الفترة 
ــة وأداء الشــركة  ــل الملكي ــك الد. الشــركات وهيك ــة راتل ــائج مختلف ــة نظــام  ســات اســفرت عــن نت ــأثرت بطبيع ت
سة الحالية أن الملكية اإلدارية رااالنحدار الخطي المتعدد، أظهرت نتائج الد باستخدام. بلدالحوكمة في كل 
. وحجم الشركة لهما تأثير ذو داللة إحصـائية علـى أداء شـركات االسـمنت المدرجـة بسـوق المـال السـعودية 
اسـتقالل مجلـس اإلدارة، حجـم : وكًال مـن ألداء المالي سة الى عدم وجود عالقة بين ارافي حين توصلت الد
  .مكتب المراجعةمجلس اإلدارة، عدد اجتماعات مجلس اإلدارة، ونوع 
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Introduction 
Nowadays, corporate governance has become a priority for the economic 
growth of any nation (Bansal & Sharma, 2016). It has become a concern in 
developing economies since the financial scandals in the past, which have 
resulted in demands for improved corporate governance practices (Baydoun et 
al., 2013). In fact, good corporate governance has become essential for 
improving firm performance, ensuring investor rights, enhancing the investment 
atmosphere and encouraging economic development (Braga-Alves & Shastri, 
2011; Price, Roman & Rountree, 2011).  
Good corporate governance also enables management to recognize 
corporate objectives, meet legal requirements, and protect shareholder rights. 
The impact of internal corporate governance on the performance of Saudi listed 
Cement firms is worthy of study for several reasons. Firstly, Saudi Stock 
Exchange is the 24th largest exchange out of the 76 stock exchanges worldwide, 
and the Saudi Stock Exchange's Market Capitalization is $442.46 Billion 
adjusted US Dollars as of March 2017; therefore, evaluating Saudi market 
performance and variables affecting this performance are important to investors.  
Secondly, since the launching of Saudi Corporate Governance Code in the 
late 2006, there has been no study investigated the relationship between firm 
performance and internal corporate governance of Saudi listed Cement firms. 
Thirdly, the results of this study about the impact of internal corporate 
governance on firm performance may help potential investors to grasp the 
importance of good corporate governance practices in protecting their interests. 
Finally, the study may add to the existing body of literature of corporate 
governance and contribute particularly to a better understanding of the potential 
components of internal corporate governance in the Saudi context.  
Accurately, the present paper studies the determinant of firm performance 
and provides additional evidence on the influence of internal corporate 
governance on firm performance in the Saudi context where corporate 
governance is still in the early stage. This paper found that managerial 
ownership has a significant positive impact on the financial performance among 
Saudi cement firms listed in stock market, other corporate governance factors 
such as board independence, board size, and board meeting are not related to the 
financial performance. The reminder of this present study proceeds as follows. 
The following section provides a detailed discussion concerning the literature 
review and hypotheses development. Following a discussion on the 
methodology, the results of the study are reported. The final section concludes 
the research.  
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Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
Corporate Governance  
The Cadbury Report (1992) defines corporate governance as the system by 
which companies are directed and controlled. This report claims that the duty for 
corporate governance lies with the board of directors whom appointed by 
shareholders to ensure that a proper governance structure is in place. The 
responsibilities of the board include setting the company’s strategic aims, 
providing the leadership to put them into effect, supervising the management of 
the business and reporting to shareholders on their stewardship. The board’s 
actions are subject to laws, regulations and the shareholders in general meeting. 
OECD (2004) suggests corporate governance engages a set of relationships 
between management, boards, shareholders and other stakeholders of the firm. 
Based on this definition, the corporate governance framework should ensure the 
strategic guidance of the company, the effective monitoring of management by 
the board, and the board’s accountability to the company and the shareholders. 
Moreover, the board is not only responsible to the company and its shareholders 
but also has a duty to act in their best interests and expected to take due regard 
of, and deal fairly with, other stakeholder interests such as employees, creditors, 
customers, suppliers and community. In order for boards to effectively fulfill 
their responsibilities, they must be able to exercise objective and independent 
judgment.  
Furthermore, Saudi Capital Market Authority (SCMA, 2017) defines the 
corporate governance as rules to lead and guide the Company that includes 
mechanisms to regulate the various relationships between the Board, Executive 
Directors, shareholders and Stakeholders, by establishing rules and procedures to 
facilitate the decision making process and add transparency and credibility to it 
with the objective of protecting the rights of shareholders and Stakeholders and 
achieving fairness, competitiveness and transparency on the Exchange and the 
business environment. The main objective of this study is to examine the impact 
of corporate governance on financial performance among Saudi cement 
companies. Board independence, board size, board meeting, and managerial 
ownership are utilized to measure corporate governance in the current study. 
Financial Performance and Board Independence 
According to (Habbash & Bajaher, 2015) agency theory assumes the more 
mix between inside and outside directors sitting in the bored; the more 
effectiveness of a board and better performance. The corporate governance 
codes issued by Saudi Capital Market Authority (2017) imposed on all listed 
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companies including the cement companies that the composition of the board 
must include independent members’ not less one-third of the members.  
Empirical studies regarding the association between the board independence 
and financial performance found inconclusive results. Some studies found a 
positive and significant relationship between the board independence and 
financial performance (Palaniappan, 2017; Habbash & Bajaher, 2015; Vintila & 
Gherghina, 2012; Nuryanah & Islam, 2011). Others, however, found a negative 
relationship between outside directors and firm performance (E.g. Sheikh, 
Wang, & Khan, 2013; Shukeri, Shin & Shaari, 2012, Bhagat & Bolton, 2008; 
Abdullah, 2006; Klein, Shapiro & Young, 2005). Other researchers have shown 
no evidence of a significant relationship with performance (Habbash 2017; 
Sheikh et al., 2013; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Kula, 2005). Owing to the mixed 
findings documented in previous researches, the hypotheses are stated below in 
the form of a positive relationship as the agency theory assumes the more mix 
between inside -and outside directors sitting in the bored; the more effectiveness 
of a board and better performance accordingly.  
H1: There is a significant positive association between the board independence 
and financial performance.  
Financial Performance and Board Size  
It is argued that the agency problems associated with larger boards is more 
higher compare to small boards ones (Habbash & Bajaher, 2015). In fact, the 
board of directors leads and controls a company and an effective board is 
fundamental to the success of a company. Lipton & Lorsch (1992) suggest that 
larger boards are less effective than smaller boards because some directors may 
free-ride on the efforts of others. Similarly, Jensen (1993) states that when 
boards get larger, they are less likely to function effectively.  
Alternatively, resource dependence theory suggests that larger boards with 
high levels of links to the external environment improve the company’s access to 
various resources and leads to better performance (Sheikh et al., 2013). Several 
studies have been done in this area. For example, Sheikh et al., (2013) and 
Jackling & Johl (2009) found a positive relationship between board size and 
financial performance, which is consistent with the predictions of the resource 
dependence theory.  
However, Shukeri, et al., (2012) found a negative association between 
company performance and board size. Finally, Nuryanah & Islam (2011) found 
no association between board size and performance proxies. From the above-
mentioned discussion, there is a mixed result with respect to the association 
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between board size and company performance. Therefore, the study examines 
this relationship based on the following hypothesis:  
H2: There is a significant positive association between board size and financial 
performance. 
Financial Performance and Board Meetings  
Board meetings is considered one of the important factors of corporate 
governance. Lipton & Lorsch (1992) assert that board members have insufficient 
time to achieve their duties and board meetings enhance the effectiveness of 
board. A higher frequency of board meeting could result to directors in carrying 
out their duties in line with shareholders' expectations and monitor management 
more efficiently (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992).  
Regarding empirical studies, there is a mixed result. Some studies found a 
positive and significant relationship between number of board meetings and 
firm’s financial performance (Palaniappan, 2017; García-Ramos & García-
Olalla, 2011). On the other hand, Rodriguez Fernandez et al. (2014) reported 
negative relationship between number of board meetings and firm’s financial 
performance. Jackling & Johl (2009) found no association between board 
meetings and firm’s financial performance. Based on these views, the current 
study hypothesized that:  
H3: There is a significant positive association between board meetings and 
financial performance.  
Financial Performance and Managerial Ownership  
According to Jensen & Meckling (1976), the greater the percentage of 
stocks owned by top managers, the more likely they will make decisions 
consistent with maximizing stockholders' wealth since that will maximize their 
own wealth. Therefore, managerial ownership serves as an important means of 
controlling agency problems.  
Researchers have studies the relationships between the managerial 
ownership and performance in different countries. Drakos & Bekiris (2010) 
provided evidence that managerial ownership has a positive impact on corporate 
performance. On the other hand, Ehikioya (2009) has shown that managerial 
ownership is negatively related to the return on assets. Further, Mousa (2010) 
found no statistically significant relation between managerial ownership and 
corporate performance. Hence, based on the above arguments, the present study 
hypothesized that:  
H4: There is a significant positive association between managerial ownership 
and financial performance.  
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Methodology  
Research Design  
This study was relying on quantitative design. Statistical analysis, table or 
graph was typically applied in this study. The evaluation and assessment of the 
firm performance was according to the data gathered from the company’s’ 
annual report.  
Sample selection and Data Collection  
This research is limited to the listed cement firms in Saudi stock market, 
covering the period from 2012 to 2016. There were 14 cement firms listed in 
Saudi stock market. After excluding one firm that have incomplete data, the total 
sample of study becomes 13 cement firms with 65 observations. The purpose of 
this study is to examine the influence of internal corporate governance 
(independent variables) on financial performance (dependent variable) for listed 
cement firms in Saudi stock market. Secondary source is used to collect required 
data. In fact, all the data of dependent variable and independent variables are 
manually collected from the annual reports of the sampled firms for the period of 
study.  
Data Analysis  
Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) was used to assess and 
analyze the collected data to examine the relationship between corporate 
governance variables and firm performance. There are two methods of analysis 
used in this study, which are descriptive and inferential Statistics analysis. These 
methods were used as the underlying statistical tests to describe the original 
characteristics of a data set and are the key to summarizing variables, examining 
the impact of independent variables on dependent variable. The following model 
will be used to test the study's hypotheses: 
FPERit = α0 + α1BINDit + α2BSIZEit + α3BMTGit + α4MOWNit + 
α5FSIZEit + α6AUTYit + e 
where, 
 FPER the company financial performance indicator which is represented by 
the Return On Assets as the main dependent variable of the study for firm 
(i) and period (t). 
 BIND represents Board Independence for firm (i) and period (t). 
 BSIZE represents Board Size of firm (i) and of period (t). 
 BMTG represents Board Meeting of firm (i) and for period (t). 
 MOWN represents Managerial Ownership of firm (i) and for period (t). 
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 FSIZE represents natural logarithm of Total Asset 
 AUTY represents a dummy variable for Audit Type of the company, 1 if the 
firm audited by one of the big4, 0 otherwise  
 e represents error term. 
Measurement of Variables 
Dependent Variable  
The dependent variable of this study is the firm’s financial performance. To 
measure this variable, the study uses Return on Assets (ROA). According to 
Habbash & Bajaher (2015) ROA is one of the best performance measures used 
to address the relationship with corporate governance. Therefore, the study uses 
ROA to find out the relationship of this measure with independent variables. 
Likewise, Habbash & Bajaher (2015), the study measures ROA as a percentage 
of profit before interest and tax divided by total assets.  
Independent Variables  
Independent variables of this study are corporate governance variables, 
namely; board independence, board size, board meeting, and managerial 
ownership. The measure of these variables in this study is based on earlier 
corporate governance studies. Table1 shows the measurement of independent 
variables used in this study.  
Control Variables  
Beside the dependent and independent variables, some firm specific 
characteristics such as firm size) and audit size are used as control variables in 
this study (Table1 shows the definitions of these two variables). The using of 
these variables as control variables is due to their impact as firm specific 
characteristics on firms’ performance. 
Table 1: Measurement of Variables  
Variable  Measurement  
Financial performance(FPER)  
Board independence (BIND) 
Board size(BSIZE)  
Board meetings (BMTG) 
Managerial ownership(MOWN) 
Firm size (FSIZE) 
Audit type (AUTY) 
The percentage of profit before interest and tax 
divided by total assets  
The percentage of independent directors to total 
directors on the board  
Number of directors sitting on the board  
Number of meetings held by the board in the year  
The percentage of number of shares hold by directors 
and executive's managers to the total shares.  
Log of total assets  
1 if the firm audited by one of the big4, 0 otherwise  
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Results  
Descriptive Statistics  
Descriptive statistics for all dichotomous and continuous variables are 
provided in Table2. Table2 shows that the highest performance of sampled 
companies is 0.33% and the minimum performance as measured by ROA is 
0.00% with a mean of 13.3%. Furthermore, the present study found that the 
cement firms listed in Saudi stock market comply with corporate governance 
requirements regarding the board independence. It found that 0.51% of such 
companies are independent directors. This is in line with the guidelines of Saudi 
Governance Code that proposed that the composition of the board must be not 
less than one-third of the members.  
Another interested finding of this paper is the board size has a mean of 8.7% 
and ranges from 6 to 11. This finding is in line of the Saudi corporate 
governance codes, which stated that the listed firms must have directors not less 
than 3 and not more than 11. The same table also shows that, on average, 
companies meets five times a year. Companies are also found to have 
managerial ownership on average about 19%. Descriptive statistics for other 
control variables (firm size and audit type) are also shown in Table2.  
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics  
 N MINIMAM MAXIMAM MEAN SD 
FPER 65 .00 .33 .1331 .08230 
BIND 65 .00 .86 .5106 .16172 
BSIZE 65 5.00 11.00 8.7846 1.74546 
BMTG 65 2.00 13.00 5.2462 2.09934 
MOWN 65 .00 .70 .1964 .17683 
FSIZE 65 9.05 9.67 9.4458 .16322 
AUTY 65 .00 1.00 .5538 .50096 
Bivariate Correlations  
Table 3 reports Pearson product-moment correlations among all variables. 
The purpose of this test to see whether there is multicollinearity between 
independent variables, which represents by high correlation between any two 
variables. According to Lind, Marchal, & Wathen (2012) highly correlated 
independent variables make it difficult to make inference about the individual 
regression coefficients and their individual effects on dependent variables. A 
critical value that represents the high correlation between two variables is 
between -0.70 and 0.70 if less, multicollinearity between variables does not exist 
(Lind et al., 2012).  
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As indicated in Table3, the correlation among variables is between -0.27 
and 0.54. The higher level of correlation found is between managerial ownership 
and financial performance as dependent variable which is 0.54 which is found to 
be significant at 0.01 level. This indicates that managerial ownership and 
financial performance has a strong positive and significant association among 
cement firms in Saudi listed stock market. The findings are in line with Drakos 
& Bekiris (2010). However, Mousa (2010) reported no significant association 
between managerial ownership and financial performance. 
Table 3: Correlations Coefficients 
 FPER BIND BSIZE BMTG MOWN FSISE AUTY 
FPER 1       
BIND -.192- 1      
BSIZE .414** -.140- 1     
BMTG .276* -.270-* -.237- 1    
MOWN .546** .020 .255* .359** 1   
FSISE .378** -.212- .349* * .246* -.016- 1  
AUTY .102 -.170- .139 .151 .105 .028 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is significant at 
the 0.05 level (2-tailed).  
The multicollinearity problems are checked through correlation matrix. The 
higher level of correlation among independent variables is 0.35 between 
managerial ownership and board meetings. By comparing the findings in table3 
with level (0.70) of multicollinearity suggested by Lind et al., (2012), it can be 
concluded that the serious multicollinearity is not exist among independent 
variables.  
Furthermore, the existence of multicollinearity is tested by calculated the 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF). According to Gujarati & Porter (2009), VIF 
value of less than 10 shows there is no multicollinearity problem. The VIF's for 
all individual variables were also very low supporting the previous conclusion 
that independent variables included in the model are not substantially correlated 
with each other. The results of the VIF and Tolerance test during multiple 
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Table4: Regression Results  
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients Stand. Coef. T-value Sig. VIF 
B Std. Error Beta 
(Constant) .009 .143  0.061 0. 951  






BSIZE .188 .128 0.188 1.465 0.148 1.082 






MOWN .488 .118 0.488 4.116 0.000 1.082 






AUTY -.016- .196 -0.008- -0.081- 0.936 1.082 






Durbin-Watson: 1.807 sig F:0.00 
Regression Results  
The main objective of this paper is to examine the relationship between the 
internal corporate governance as independent variables and profitability as 
dependent variable. To achieve this objective, the multivariate analysis was run. 
In fact, Ordinary Lease Square analysis (OLS) is used to test the hypothesis. 
OLS regression is a powerful technique especially when the model contains 
continuous and dummy variables (Hutcheson & Sofroniou, 1999).  
The findings of regression analysis is shown in Table4. As indicated in 
Table4, the  
F-value of the model is highly significant at the 1 percent level and the 
adjusted R-squared is 43%. Thus, it can be concluded that the independent 
variables explain (47%) of the variability in financial performance of Saudi 
cement listed firms. This value is higher than adjusted R-squared obtained by 
10
Jerash for Research and Studies Journal ???? ??? ?????? ?????????, Vol. 20 [2021], Iss. 2, Art. 13
https://digitalcommons.aaru.edu.jo/jpu/vol20/iss2/13
Corporate Governance and Financial Performance…   Jerash for Research and Studies 
 707
Habbash & Bajaher, (2015) and Cheng (2008) who reported only 17% and 28% 
respectively.  
AS shown in Table4, board independence is negatively, related to the 
financial performance, but the relationship is insignificant. This finding is 
opposite to H1, which predict a significant positive association between financial 
performance and board independence. However, the result is line with such prior 
studies performance (Habbash 2017; Sheikh et al., 2013; Haniffa & Hudaib, 
2006). However, the results contradict the agency theory argument that the 
presence of independent directors improves firm performance. Such a 
contradiction stems from the lack of business knowledge and the lack of true 
independence as large shareholders are the only ones responsible for appointing 
independent directors (Al-Saidi & Al-Shammari, 2013).  
In the board size, the finding reported insignificant positive association with 
firm performance. Hence, H2 cannot be accepted. In fact, the results indicate 
that larger boards are ineffective in enhancing financial performance. The lack 
of association between large boards and financial performance is similar to 
Habbash & Bajaher, (2015) and Nuryanah & Islam (2011). Another finding of 
the current study is a positive relationship between firm financial performance 
and board meetings, but not significance. Thereby, H3 is rejected. This finding is 
in line with Jackling & Johl (2009). However, this result is in contrast with result 
of studies done by Palaniappan, (2017) and García-Ramos & GarcíaOlalla, 
(2011).  
Regarding the fourth hypothesis which predicts significant positive 
association between the financial performance and managerial ownership. The 
finding reported a significant positive relationship between the financial 
performance and managerial ownership. Therefore, H4 is accepted. This result is 
in line with results of study conducted by Drakos & Bekiris (2010), they found 
that managerial ownership is related to financial performance. In contrast, 
Mousa (2010) found no statistically significant relation between managerial 
ownership and financial performance. 
For control variables, in terms of firm size, the result reported a significant 
positive relationship between the financial performance and firm size. The larger 
firms the more investment they have and leading to better performance. The 
results consistent with the findings of Ehikioya (2009) and Habbash & Bajaher 
(2015). On the other hand, the current study found a negative association 
between the financial performance and audit type but no significance. This 
result, however, is in contrast of findings of Habbash & Bajaher (2015).  
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Conclusion  
This study explores the impact of corporate governance on the financial 
performance of cement companies listed in Saudi stock market during the period 
of 2012-2016. Empirical studies indicate that managerial ownership has 
significant positive affect on the financial performance. Board independence is 
found to be not related to the financial performance among Saudi listed cement 
companies. However, the results contradict the agency theory argument that the 
presence of independent directors improves firm performance.  
Further, board size and board meetings appear to be insignificant 
association to the financial performance. Board meetings appear to be 
insignificant related to the financial performance. With respect to the control 
variables, the finding demonstrates that firm size has a significant positive 
impact on the financial performance. However, audit type has no impact on the 
financial performance. 
Limitations and Future Research  
Like all studies the present study has some limitations that need to be 
acknowledged and addressed when assessing the findings of the study. First, the 
data was collected through publicly available data sources such as annual reports 
and other databases. Other data could be helpful to gain more of an insight. 
Second, while the study focuses only on a limited number of corporate 
governance variables (four variables), this study opens avenues for future 
research by considering the impact of corporate governance using other 
variables such as competence of the directors, CEO tenure, and directors’ 
qualifications for several years. Moreover, there is a room for further research to 
compare the firm performance before and after the adoption of new governance 
code to see whether this adoption makes any change in Saudi firms’ 
performance.  
Third, the sample size is small. In fact, this study has only covered the 
period from 2012 to 2016, with a sample of 13 firms out of Saudi listed firms; 
hence, the validity of the findings interpreted in this study is limited to the scope 
of the data and the condition of economics for the period of the data. For future 
research, the sample size could be increased by including a longer period and 
different sectors or different countries such as members of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC).  
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